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[.L. A. No. 26695.

In Bank.

May S, 1962.]

ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and FRED
MONTANA, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Aggravation of Preexisting Disease.-Whether a disability of an employee results in whole or in part from the normal progress
of a preexisting disease or represents a fully compensable
lighting up or aggravation of a preexisting condition is a
question for the Industrial Accident COlllmission to determine, and its award will not be annulled if there is substantial
evidence to support it.
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Aggravation of Preexisting Disease or Condition.-Where an employee who injured his back
lifting a heavy steel blade onto a truck testified that he had
never had back trouble before the injury nnd several doctor~,
who agreed that before the injury the employee hnd an unstable lumbosacral spine with SOUle arthritis, described hi:>
former condition as "asymptomatic," the Industrial Accident
Commission could reasonably conclude that the preexisting
condition did not call for apportionment of the disability
under Lab. Code, § 4663.
[3] Id.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of
Average Earnings.-The purpose of Lab. Code, § 4453, subd.
(d), relating to computation of average weekly earnings for
disability indemnity, is to equalize for compensation purpose:>
the position of the full-time, regularly employed worker
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation, § 101; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 247.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation, § 161 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Workmen's Compensation, § 113;
[3-9, 11] Workmen's Compensation, § 224; [10] Workmen's Compensation, § 272(8).
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whose earning capacity is merely a multiple of his daily wage
and that of the worker whose wage at the time of injury may
be aberrant or otherwise a distorted basis for estimating true
earning power.
ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of
Earnings.-It would not be consistent with the purpose of Lab.
Code, § 4453, subd. (d), rela ting to compu t ation of average
weekly earnings for disability indemnity, to foreclose a worker
from a maximum temporary or permanent award simply
because a brief recession had forced him to work sporadically
or at a low wage. Nor in making a permanent disability
award would it be consistent with the purpose of the statute
to base a finding of maximum earning capacity solely on a
high wage, ignoring irregular employment and low income
over a long pex:i0d of time.
ld.-Compensation and Bene5.ts Recoverable-Computation of
Earnings.-An estimate of an injUl·ed employee's earning
capacity is a prediction of what the employee's earnings would
have been had he not been injured. In the case of a temporary award, the prediction of earnings need only be made for
the duration of the temporary disability. In the case of a
permanent award, the prediction is more complex because the
compensation is for loss of earning power over a long span of
time; the applicant's earning capacity could be maximum for
a temporary award and minimmn for a permanent award or
the reverse.
ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of
Earnings.-Evidence sufficient to sustain a maximum temporary award for a disabled employee might not sustain a maximmn permanent award. In making an award for temporary
disability, the Industrial Accident Commission will ordinarily
be concerned with whether an applicant would have continued
working at a given wage for the duration of the disability; in
making a permanent award, long-term earning history is a
reliable guide in predicting earning capacity, although in a
variety of fact situations earning history alone may be mialeading.
ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of
Earnings.-With regard to both temporary and permanent
awards to a disabled employee, all facts relevant and helpful
to make the estimate of earning capacity must be considereJ.
The applicant's ability to work, his willingness and opportunities to work, his skill and education, the general condition of the labor market, and employment opportunities for
persons similarly situated arc all relevant. In weighing such
facts, the Industrial Accident Commission may make use of
its general knowledge as a basis of reasonable forecast.
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[8] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of
Earnings.-In weighing the evidence relevant to earning capacity of a disabled employee, the Industrial Accident Commission
has the same range of di scretion that it has in apportioning
injuries between industrial and nonindustrial causes. It must,
however, ha,e evidence that will at least demonstrate the
reasonableness of the determination made.
[9a,9b] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of Earnings.-An Industrial Accident Commission award
assuming maximum earning capacity, notwithstanding the
referee's findings that the applicant's earning capacity was less
than the minimum for compensation purposes, and based on
the commission's statement that he was a permanent employee
working irregularly over a five-year period due to business
conditions, should be annulled and the cause remanded for
further proceedings where the commission did not specify
the nature of the business conditions referred to and where,
had it given "duc consideration to actual earnings from all
sources of employments" (Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. (d» and
heard evidence tending to show thRt the applicant's lean years
were unusual for him and that men with similar skills, ages,
physical characteristics and earning histories were becoming
steadily employed, it could properly have discounted the applicant's earning history.
[10] ld. - Review - Findings. - Findings that an applicant for
workmen's compensation was a "permanent employee" and that
his sporadic employment was caused by "business conditions"
are ambiguous. If meant to distinguish the case of a person
who is a constant competitor on the labor market from one
who by choice enters and leaves that market periodically,
tbe finding that the applicant was a "permanent employee" is
essentially no more than a finding of his willingness to work.
[11] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation
of Earnings.-Willingness to work can be meaningful in predicting what an applicant's earnings would have been only if
considered in the light of his employment opportunities. If the
business conditions causing temporary low earnings are no
more than a short recession, the earnings will most likely not
represent earning capacity for purposes of a permanent award.
Long-run business conditions, however, necessarily have a
bearing on ability to earn.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding temporary and permanent dis·
ability compensation for personal injuries. Award of temporary compensation affirmed; award of permanent compensation annulled and cause remanded with directions.
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H erlihy & H erlihy, Robert R. Smith and Ray B. Cumming
for P etitioner.
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Thcotlore P. Niedermill er, Edmund D . L eonard, Clair \V. MacLeod, L ewelly n T.
McMahon , L . Richard Bloomer, Charles A. Rummel, E isner &
Titchell, Norman A . Eisner, Hanna & Brophy and Warren L .
Hanna as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Ever ett A. Corten, Edward A. Sarkisian, Richman, Garrett
& Ansell and Lewis Garrett for Respondents.

Charles P . Scully and Lowell A . Airola as Amici Curiae
on behalf of R espondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-On June 20, 1960, Fred Montana injured
his back lifting a heavy steel blade onto a truck. A coworker
holding one end of the blade dropped it without warning, and
Montana, suddenly holding almost the entire load, "felt something tight in . . . lhis back] . " The injury, an acute lumbosacral str ain, r esulted in temporary total disability and partial
permanent disability. Petitioner paid Montana temporary
compensation of $928.57 at the rate of $65 a week before the
Industrial Accident Commission made its award. The referee
determined that 75 per cent of the disability should be apportioned to a preexisting back condition, that Montana 's earning
capacity was less than minimum for compensation purposes,
and that the award should therefore be based on average
weekly earnings of $20 a week. Computed at this rate, Mont ana would be entitled to $285.72 as temporary compensation
and $440 for permanent disability. Under this computation
the insurance carrier had overpaid Montana $243.57. The
commission held, however, that the evidence did not require
apportionment of the disability under Labor Code section 4663
and that Montana's "earning capacity was maximum under
Section 4453 (d) of the Labor Code. " Accordingly, the commission awarded him $4,620 as permanent indemnity and
approved the t emporary compensation paid.
Montana t estified that he had never had back trouble before
the injury. No evidence contradicted this testimony, and
several doctors described his former condition as "asymptomatic. " Ne.v ertheless, the medical experts agreed that even
before the injury he had an unstable lumbosacral spine with
some arthritis and that he should not have been lifting heavy
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objects. When asked what advice he would have given Montana before the accident, the independent medical examiner
testified: "I don't know-I couldn't tell him not to lift,
because I know he would. We look at a number of things.
I would not advise him to give up his work, if this is all he
knows how to do, because some of th cse guys do get by indefinitely." (Italics added.) Describing Montana's prcaceident
condition, he stated: "There was some increase in the lumbosacral angle with mild scoliosis. His pelvis was tipped forward. He had some degenerative changes which were not
marked. I mean, there was nothing unusual about the x-rays
for a man of this build . . . and age. They are not too far
away from normal, about what you w01tld expect with his
build and age." (Italics added.) Another doctor stated in
his report: "There is no evidence of pre-existing symptomatic
bone or joint disease and no history of previous low back
injury or disability. The osteoarthritic changes visualized are
no more in evidence in the area of symptoms than they are
in other areas of his spine. At most they delayed his functional recovery."
[1] Whether a disability results in whole or in part from
"the normal progress of a preexisting disease" (Industrial
Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 95 Cal.App.2d 443, 450
[213 P.2d 11]) or represents a fully compensable lighting
up or aggravation of a preexisting condition is a question
for the commission to determine, and its award will not be
annulled if there is substantial evidence to support it.
(Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 29 Cal.2d 79,83-84
[172 P.2d 884] ; Tanenbaum v. Industrial Acc. Com., 4 Ca1.2d
615, 617 [52 P.2d 215].) [2] In view of the foregoing
testimony, the commission could reasonably conclude that the
preexisting condition did not call for apportionment. (See
Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com ., 104 Cal.
App .2d 567 [232 P.2d 11].)
The more difficult question is whether the commission correctly determined Montana's earning capacity under subdivision (d) of section 4453 of the Labor Code 1 in computing
'The statute read at the time the award was made:
"In computing average annual earnings for purposes of temporary
disability indemnity only, the average weekly earnings shall be taken
at not less than thirty dollars and seventy-se~en cents ($30.77) nor more
than one hundred dollars (tlOO). In computing average annual earnings
for purposes of permanent disability indemnity. the average weekly
earnings shall be taken at not less than thirty dollars and seventy-seven
cents (t30.77) nor more than eighty dollars and seventy-seven cents

GD4

ARGONAUT INS. Co. v. INDUSTRIAL Acc. COM. [57 C.2d

temporary and permanent disability compensation. Othcr
suUdivisions of that section (Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. (a),
(b), (c)) set forth formulae for computing average weekly
earnings that in turn are made the basis for the two types of
award. (Lab. Code, §§ 4653-4655; 4658-4662.) [3] When
an employee is steadily cmployed at a full-time job his earning capacity is determined by an appropriate formula (see
W est V. Industrial Ace. Com., 79 Cal.App.2d 711, 722 [180
P.2d 972] ). When the employment is for less than 30 hours a
,reek or when a formula "cannot reasonably and fairly be
applied" the commission must make its own estimate of
weekly earning capacity at the time of the injury. (Lab.
Code, § 4453, subd. (d).) The purpose of this provision is
to equalize for compensation purposes the position of the
full-time, regularly employed worker whose earning capacity
is merely a multiple of his daily wage and that of the worker
whose wage at the time of injury may be aberrant or otherwise a distorted basis for estimating true earning power.
[4] It would hardly be consistent with that purpose to
foreclose a worker from a maximum temporary or permanent
award simply because a brief recession had forced him to work
sporadically or at a low wage. Nor in making a permanent
disability award would it be consistent with the purpose of
the statute to base a finding of maximum earning capacity
solely on a high wage, ignoring irregular employment and
low income over a long period of time.
[5] An estimate of earning capacity is a prediction of
what an employee's earnings would have been had he not
been injured. Earning capacity, for the purposes of a temporary award, however, may differ from earning capacity for
the purposes of a permanent award. In the fonner case the
prediction of earnings need only be made for the duration
of the temporary disability. In the latter the prediction is
more complex because the compensation is for loss of earning
power over a long span of time. Thus an applicant's earning
capacity could be maximum for a temporary R\nrd and mini($80.77). Between these limits the average weekly earnings .. • shall
be arri\"ed at as follows:
"[
]
" ( d) Where the employment is for less than 30 hours per week, or
where for any reason the foregoing methods of nrriving at the nverage
weekly earnings cnnnot Tcasonnbly and fairly be applied, the average
"eekly earnings shall be taken nt 95 percent of the Sum which reason·
ably represents the arerage weekly earning capacity of the injured
employee at the time of his injury, dlle consideration bein.Q girl'1l to hi8
actual earnings from all sourccs and employments." (Italics added.)
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mum fo!' a permancnt award or the rcverse. [6] Evidence
sufficicnt to sustain a maximum temporary award might not
sustain a maximum permanent award. In making an award
for tcmporary disability, the commission will ordinarily be
concern cd with whether an applicant would have continued
working at a givcn wage for the duration of the disability.
In making a permancnt award, long. term earning history is
a reliable guide in predicting earning capacity, although in
a variety of fact situations earning history alone may be
misleading. [7] With regard to both awards all facts relevant and helpful to making the estimate must be considered.
(Colonial Mut. Camp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 47 Cal.
App.2d 487, 490·492 [118 P.2d 361] ; Aetna Life 1-ns. Co. v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 130 Cal.App. 488, 491·492 [20 P.2d
372] ; see Southern B ell Tel. &; Tel. Co. v. Bell (Fla.) 116
So.2d 617, 620·621; Vann ey v. Alaska Packers Assn., 12
Alaska 284, 290-291 ; Larson, The Law of \Vorkmen's Compensation, § 57.21 at pp. 4-7.) The applicant's ability to work,
his age and health, his willingness and opportunities to work,
his skill and education, the general condition of the labor
market, and employment opportunities fo r persons similarly
situated are all relevant. (See West v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
supra at p. 722; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
supra at pp. 491-492.) In weighing such facts, the commission
may make use of "'its general knowledge as a basis of
.reasonable forecast.' " (Latour v. Prod1!Cel's Dairy, Inc., 102
N.H. 5 [148 A .2d 655, 657] ; compare Russell v. S01~theastern
Util. Service Co., 230 Miss. 272 [92 So.2d 544, 547J.) [8] In
weighing the evidence relevant to earning capacity the commission has the same range of discretion that it has in
apportioning injuries between industrial and nonindustrial
causes. (See e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
supra at p. 493.) It must, however, "have evidence that will
at least demonstrate the reasonableness of the determination
made." (Davis v. Industrial Com. of Arizona, 82 Ariz. 173
[309 P.2d 793, 795].)
[9a] Montana was 50 years old when he was injured,
and he had established a pattern of intermittent work that
apparently extended over five years. He worked as a laborer,
usually on construction projects, was generally paid at a high
hourly rate, and took any employment offered to him through
his union. He held four jobs during the 15 months preceding his injury. Two of them lasted only three days. During
the winter of -1959-1960 he worked 15 to 17 days as a brick

)
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tender, earning between $104 and $125 a week. At the time of
his injury, he had been employed for two months on a flood
control project on which he earned $887 .20. Total earn ings
over the 15-month period amounted to between $1,200 and
$1,300.
In measuring earning capacity, the commission must give
"due consideration to actual earnings from all sources and
employments." (Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. ( d) .) The evidence herein of a long record of irregular employment and
low earnings would seem, therefore, to require a finding of
minimum earning capacity in making the permanent award
unless there were other relevant facts tending to support II
contrary conclusion. In this regard, the commission stated
that "the duration of . . . [Montana's] work was indefinite,"
and that he was" a permanent employee working irregularly
due to business conditions."
The only sense in which the
job was indefinite, however, was that no one could say for certain how many weeks it would last. The fact that Montana
was hired only for a particular project that was completed
within three months of the date of his injury indicates that
the job was contemplated to be of limited duration. [10] The
findings that he was a "permanent employee" and that hi'>
sporadic employment was caused by "business conditions"
are ambiguous. The commission could not mean that Montana normally held a steady job or that his employment at
the time of injury was" permanent." It probably meant to
distinguish the case of a person who is a constant !'ompetitor
on the labor market from one who by choice enters and leaves
that market periodically. (See Larson , supra, at §§ 60.20,
60.21, 60.22, pp. 72-78; compare Campb ell v. Ind1lstn·al Acc.
Com., 95 Cal.App.2d 570 [213 P.2d 395] and West v. Industrial Acc. Corn ., supra, with O'Hcarne v. Maryland Cas. Co .,
177 F .2d 979.) In this sense, the finding that Montana was a
"permanent employee" is essentially no more than a finding
of his willingness to work. [11] Willingness to work, however, can be meaningful in predicting what an applicant's
earnings would have been only if considered in the light of his
employment opportunities. With r egard to such opportunities
the commission stated that "business conditions" caused
Montana's low and unstable earning history. If the business
conditions causing temporary low earnings are no more than
a short recession, the earnings will most likely not represent
earning capacity for purposes of a permanent award. Longrun business conditions, however, necessarily have a bearing
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on ability to earn. [9b] The commission did not specify the
nature of the business conditions referred to. Had it heard
evidence tending to show that Montana's five lean years were
unusual for him, that the construction industry in the area
anticipated a period of prosperity, that men with similar
skills, ages, physical characteristics, and earning histories
were becoming steadily employed, it could properly have discounted Montana's earning history. In the absence of such
evidence, however, the commission failed to give due consideration to actual earnings as required by section 4453.
The commission had substantial evidence, however, to support its award for temporary disability. Montana worked
for two months on the project, which lasted for an additional
three months following the injury, and he would probably
have continued thereon had he not been disabled.
The award of temporary disability compensation is affirmed. The award of permanent disability compensation is
annulled, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J ., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Dooling, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied June 4,
1962.

